Ti t l e R u s s kiy m i r : t h e g e o p olitic s of R u s si a n c o m p a t rio t s a b r o a d
Introduction
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, 25 million Russians suddenly lived abroad, outside of the new state borders of the Russian federation. How the Russian government should deal with these citizens became a subject of domestic debate within Russia and provoked a stream of scholarly studies on the subject (Aasland 1996; Kolstø 1993 Kolstø , 1995 Kolstø , 2001 Zevelev 1996 Zevelev , 2001 Melvin 1995 Melvin , 1998 Zevelev 1996 Zevelev , 1998 Shevel 2012) . Speculations that these new Russian diasporas might form political opposition groups in their new home states, become advocates for irredentist territorial claims, or 'vote with their feet' and emigrate to the Russian federation fueled the demand for new policies towards these Russians abroad (Heleniak 2004, 99) .
1 Policy responses ranged from Russian protests over new language and citizenship laws in the newly-independent neighbouring states (notably Estonia and Latvia) 2 to new legislation in Russia aimed at defining ethnic and linguistic benchmarks for 'Russianness'. Yet, despite speculation to the contrary (Kolstø 1993; Laitin 1995) , the Russian government during the 1990s did not devise transnational policies to influence Russians abroad in ways that would constitute an unlawful interference in the domestic affairs of other sovereign states. The latter is a principle in public international law explicitly underlined in Russia's Foreign Policy . This presents us with a puzzle that this paper posits to address: Russia's use of its diasporas within a wider 'Russian world' as a means for geopolitical ends (and which observers have called territorial revisionism) breaches the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs of other states that Russia's elite discourse continues to make reference to. Ruth Deyermond (2016) has theorized on a dual approach to sovereignty that Russia applies: a 'post-Soviet' approach for its neighborhood where sovereignty is contingent, and a 'Westphalian' model for states beyond its neighborhood, and it will be analysed here how diaspora arguments were put forward to smooth over such a contradiction in public diplomacy. Observed discrepancies between geopolitical strategies, the discursive framing of foreign policies, and international agreements, however, are not unique to Russia. Stephen Krasner has famously called sovereignty 'organized hypocrisy ' (1999) ,
arguing that the frequent violation of longstanding norms has been an enduring feature of international relations. The projection of a particular narrative is part and parcel of public diplomacy. The aim is to make an intended audience receptive to one's own foreign policy objectives. States employ 'strategic narratives' to favorably influence other actors in international affairs (Miskimmon, O'Loughlin & Roselle 2013) .
Against this backdrop, it would be an analytical fallacy to assume that Russian foreign policy is inherently more 'revisionist' than that of other governments. The fine line between diplomacy and public relations is about the distinction between communicating policies and selling them. This is not unique to Russian foreign policy, but the terms may differ. Saari (2014) has found a distinction between a general 'obshechestvennaya diplomatiya' (public diplomacy) and Russia's public diplomacy geared towards its post-Soviet neighborhood labeled 'gumanitarnoe sotrudnichestvo' (humanitarian cooperation') (54). 'Humanitarian cooperation', as misleading as the term is in a Western understanding, is understood as the umbrella term for Russia's policies towards its 'compatriots' abroad. This paper shows how the recurrence to such a 'humanitarian' aspect was used in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in
2014.
Blending a geopolitical analysis of the two conflicts mentioned with a conceptual discussion of the policy relevance of 'Russian diasporas', the paper thus conceptualizes the political instrumentalisation of Russian 'compatriots' abroad within the literature at the interstice of diaspora studies and conflict analysis. Case studies of the identities of Russian diasporas have been conducted elsewhere, in particular with a view to places where large populations of Russians are to be found: Estonia (Kallas 2016; Smith 1999; Smith & Wilson 1997; Lauristin & Heidmets 2003; Korts 2009 ), Belarus (Brüggeman 2014); Latvia (Smith 1999) , Ukraine and Kazhastan (King & Melvin 2000) ; and Central Asia (Kosmarskaya 2011; Ziegler 2006; Grigas 2016) . Likewise, analyses of the evolution of the 'Russian World' concept have been conducted before (Bremer 2015; Gasimov 2012; Jilge 2014; Kudors 2014; O'Loughin, Toal & Kolosov 2016; Shchedrovitskii 2000; Zabirko 2015; Zevelev 2014 Instead, the analysis that follows focuses on the link between the evolution of the 'Russian World' conception and Russian compatriot policies, and the use of these to justify geopolitical boundary-making. Methodologically, the political use of Russian diasporas in conflict situations will be analysed by way of qualitative document analysis of independent commissioned reports, primary Russian policy documents and the scholarly literature. The angle taken is that of a foreign policy analysis, where the rhetoric used by the Russian government will be embedded in a process-tracing analysis of the evolution of state policies towards Russians residing abroad (Beach & Pedersen 2013, 3) .
The argument proceeds in three sections. A first section provides a brief conceptual overview of Russians abroad, and distinguishes between ethnic, linguistic, and other indicators used to classify Russians abroad as part of a 'diaspora'. This section draws on the literature of diaspora studies and provides the conceptual foundation for this paper. A second section briefly outlines the evolution of Russian diaspora policies, and how Russians abroad became 'compatriots' in Russian governmental discourse during the Yeltsin and Putin administrations. A third section analyses how a discourse on Russian diasporas translated into military policies in two conflict situations: The war in Georgia in 2008, and the annexation of Crimea in 2014. It will be argued that these two conflicts reveal implicit contradictions in Russian public diplomacy and Russian approaches to 'state sovereignty'. The political costs involved, however, were seen as being outweighed by strategic benefits.
Russians abroad: A conceptual overview
Defining diasporas has been notoriously difficult. King and Melvin (1999/2000) lament the 'semantic malleability of the label "diaspora"' (113), and Brubaker (2005) even writes that the term 'diaspora' has been 'stretched to the point of uselessness' (3). Most definitions, Brubaker continues, revolve around three main criteria: Dispersion (of a diaspora across state borders), 'homeland orientation' (broadly defined as a certain collective memory and emotional attachment to the 'homeland'), and 'boundary-maintenance', which he defines as the 'preservation of a distinctive identity vis-à-vis a host society' (6). 4 These criteria have been emphasized in most other seminal accounts of diasporas (e.g. Armstrong 1976; Safran 1991, 83; Cohen 1997, 24; Tölöyan 1996, 14) .
Senses of belonging and identity, however, can overlap. Brah (1996, 208-9) therefore writes of a 'diaspora space' that is characterized by the contestedness of belonging and Otherness, and Faist (1998) writes in this context of a 'transnational social space' (216).
Senses of belonging can be the result of 'transethnic and transborder linguistic categories' (Brubaker 2005, 3) . This can create frictions between host and home countries, as it opens up the possibility for advocacy by foreign governments on behalf of their ethnic brethren abroad at the expense of immigration and assimilation policies in host societies (Moore & Davis 1998) . 'Diasporisation' has therefore come to be understood as the 'ethnification of transnational connections' (Kallas 2016, 2) . Such a reading has given rise to analyses of the usage of diasporas for foreign policy goals on the part of their 'homeland' states. For instance, studies have analysed the links between diaspora politics and the potential for transnational mobilization of Russians abroad in the post-Soviet environment (Aasland 1996; Kolstø 1993 Kolstø , 1995 Kolstø , 2001 Zevelev 1996; Melvin 1995 Melvin , 1998 Zevelev 1996 Zevelev , 1998 Shevel 2012 (King and Melvin: 1999/2000, 116) . The role of Serbia in the Bosnian war in the 1990s is more complex and involved ethnoterritorial claims and the mobilization of paramilitary and transnational actors. Constraints on the ability of 'ethnic patrons' to either mobilize diasporas or employ the argument about diaspora protection in foreign policy include a 'sense of attachment to the homeland among the dispersed ethnic group, competing foreign policy priorities within the kin state, and the economic resources that the kin state can wield to reach out to its diaspora' (King and Melvin, 1999/2000, 110) . 'Diaspora politics', King and Melvin (1999/2000) continue, 'is in this sense more an antidote to irredentism than a catalyst for territorial conflict ' (136) . The Russian diaspora is no exception, and is far from a homogenized entity (Smith & Wilson 1997, 846) . Rather than enticing Russians abroad to embrace revisionist policies or actively tie them into compatriot policies, 'all ethnic groups with a cultural and historic link to Russia were "diasporized" through a growing reference to the Russian-speaking minorities in the former republics as "compatriots" (sootechestvenniki)', Pilkington & Flynn (2001, 11) write.
Against the background of this (deliberate) semantic ambiguity, the remainder of this paper will shed light on the reference to 'compatriots' in the formation of Russian diaspora policies in a first part, while a second part discusses references to Russian 'compatriots' in conflict situations as an illustration of the translation of Russian compatriot policies into operational security policies.
The perception of Russian compatriots in Russian foreign policy
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the fault line, Brubaker (2000) Policy responses of the Russian government initially were mixed. Russia did not encourage a mass return of its 'beached diaspora' (Laitin 1995) , but rather engaged in advocacy on the Russian diaspora's behalf to push for the granting of dual citizenship (Heleniak 2004, 111) . This often went hand in hand with critiques of non-Russian states' language laws. In 1992, the Russian government criticized Estonia and Latvia for disadvantaging Russian language-speakers (Hill and Gaddy 2013, 34-35) . Both states had linked the granting of citizenship to residence and language requirements (Grigas 2016, 66) . It was around this time that influential voices within Russia began to realize the potential of Russian diasporas as leverage tools in foreign policy. In late 1992, Sergei Karaganov's name became attached to the idea that Moscow should see ethnic Russians residing abroad as a tool to gain influence in these regions (Smith et al. 2002, 161) . 5 Publicly emphasizing their right to speak Russian, so an often-repeated reading went, would serve to keep the diaspora's loyalty to Moscow and function as an entry point into the formulation of societal and economic policies of their new home states (Mackinnon 2014; Melvin 1995, 10) . At the UN level, the Russian government started to couch its policies in the 'near abroad' in humanitarian terms that revolved around concerns for cultural, linguistic, economic, educational and political rights of Russians abroad (Smith 1999, 508) . This discourse reached a new level that would lay the basis for later policy arguments when in September 1993 at the UN General Assembly, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev declared Russia's 'special responsibility' for protecting Russian language speakers (including in Transnistria and the Baltic states). He also demanded the UN grant Russia primacy in future peacekeeping missions in the former Soviet republics (Hill & Gaddy 2013, 34-35) . The
Baltics would have none of that. 'Russia thought that they could administer our independence post-1991', an Estonian foreign ministry official told the author in an interview. 7 Soviet forces had to withdraw, which they did by 1994. Russian troops, however, stayed in Georgia and
Azerbaijan (Fischer 2016, 15 (Ziegler 2006, 121) . While migration policy is a policy domain that falls within the competence of the interior ministry, the foreign ministry had thus been tasked with policy coordination to do with Russian diasporas (Russian foreign ministry 2017). The Putin administration had come to the realization by the mid-2000s that the presence of large diaspora populations in many of the non-Russian states in the post-Soviet neighborhood was going to remain a permanent feature of Russia's neighborhood policies. 8 The 2008 Russian Foreign Policy Concept commits the government to protect compatriots abroad, and identifies 'discrimination and the suppression of the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of the citizens of the Russian Federation in foreign states' as main threats to not only Russian compatriots, but also Russian security interests (Kremlin 2008; Hedenskog and Larsson 2007, 33) . Kristina Kallas (2016) thus writes: 'The interchangeable usage of "compatriot protection"
and "national interest protection" raised questions about the role compatriots might play also in serving "national interests"' (emphasis in the original, 6).
After 2006, compatriot policies reached a new level of institutional consolidation. The foreign ministry set up a 'department for relations with compatriots abroad', and Coordination Councils of Russian diasporas were set up abroad to work closely with the Russian foreign ministry (Brüggemann 2014, 92 Language here is linked to the preservation of a particular cultural community that sets the 'Russian World' apart from other, e.g. Western cultures, and it is at this point that a conceptual framework began to emerge that serves to bind together diaspora identity politics and cultural diplomacy. The focus on the link between language and culture harks back to the russkiy mir debates of the 19th century, in which the 'Russian World' became defined as the slavophile antipode to the European orientation of the Zapadniki (Gasimov 2012, 71) . This rediscovery was promoted by an eclectic range of movements and actors, from Alexander Dugin's obscure neo-Eurasianism (Mathyl 2002) 12 to the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). Besides intra-Georgian politics, the negative atmospherics between Putin and Saakashvili and the particulars of Georgian-Russian relations, the 2008 war therefore also had instrumental value for broader Russian-Western relations. Different readings of Russian foreign policy in this episode lie at the heart of heated debates about conceptions of sovereignty, but also expose the dilemma of regressive causality. One either subscribes to a reading that biopolitical arguments (compatriot policies) were merely put forward by a Russian government to justify territorial shifts, or to a reading that emphasizes revisions in the political status quo which promised potential revisions in the territorial status quo as well on the part of other powers which have triggered Russian interventions. The former reading focuses on a Russian government reevaluating its fading regional hegemony, bent on dominating its neighbors, the latter on actions on the part of the Georgian government, on NATO expansion plans, and on a perceived Western 'encirclement' of Russia. 19 The US and the EU, according to the latter perception, had attempted to pull Georgia and Ukraine into the What is thus relevant here for an investigation into the link between such military operations and 'compatriot' policies is that the more complex empirics of the respective conflicts were framed in a way that would justify Russian intervention as a 'rescue mission' of co-ethnics and compatriots against the invoked twin threats of 'fascism' and 'genocide' in neighboring sovereign countries. Russia presented its policies as reactions to a provocative and reckless Georgian leadership and as a necessary corrective to artificial borders of nominally independent states that were hiding more complex ethnoterritorial and sociopolitical realities (Medvedev 2008a given that Abkhaz do not consider themselves 'Russian' in any meaningful way apart from citizenship status (Petersen 2017, 98-99) .
Four days later, Medvedev took the step to call the actions of the Georgian forces 'genocide' (Medvedev 2008b) . Similarly, Russia's UN ambassador Vitaly Churkin and Russia's foreign minister talked of 'genocide' when referring to Georgian military actions in South Ossetia -an instrumental language that implicitly justified Russia's intervention for humanitarian reasons (UNSC 2008, 8; Fawn and Nalbandov 2014, 73) . The Russian government thereby started to adopt a discourse emanating from Ossetia, and formulated a responsibility to protect Russian passport-holders from alleged genocide planned and carried out by the government in Tbilisi (Karagiannis 2014, 405; Allison 2008; IIFFMCG 2009 ). It also was quick to compare the situation with NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999 in an attempt to end atrocities against ethnic Albanians. 20 The Kosovo 'precedent' identified by the Russian government indicated that the Kremlin began to re-frame its Georgian operation as a humanitarian intervention, relying on a similar language that the West had used in 1999 -with the difference that 'humanitarian cooperation', as noted above, here referred to the protection of Russian 'compatriots' abroad. Russia had begun to conceptualise its very own 'responsibility to protect' minorities abroad despite its previous resistance to the doctrine (Toal 2017, 185 (Faist 1998, 216) characteristic of diasporas, but a 'homeland orientation' (Brubaker 2000, 6) Emphasizing the need to protect Russian passport-holders, as in Georgia's case, was not a prominent policy feature in Ukraine, because the need to protect 'compatriots' was based on the alleged linguistic discrimination of Russophones by the Ukrainian authorities. The new interim government in Kiev, in Putin's speeches, constituted a threat to Russian speakers and religious minorities in Ukraine, and especially in the east and Southeast, including Crimea (Hill and Gaddy 2013, 365) . Russia was alleging that right-wing, nationalist forces in Kiev were suppressing ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers (Stewart 2017, 18; Toal 2017, 223-226) .
The ( Ukraine' in exchange for Ukraine's accession to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty as a means of denuclearizing its Soviet-inherited nuclear arsenal. 22 With this, the Russian government violated a principle it repeatedly mentions as inviolable (Stewart 2017, 11) .
The wider political implications of Russian military support for its compatriots abroad is that it lays bare the contradiction inherent in Russia's talk about non-interference and state sovereignty as inviolable principles of international law. Russian politicians have justified this contradiction with reference to past Western violations of state sovereignty, and have cited the Kosovo case as the precedent that has opened a dangerous Pandora's box on secessionism (Putin 2006) . A discrepancy between discourse and behaviour is not an unsurprising finding in foreign policy analysis. The claim to protect populations divided by state borders, however, (Russia as a 'divided nation') raises legitimate concerns if combined with policies of territorial revisionism. International law and the conception of state sovereignty, so the outside impression, are seen as dispensable when clashing with Russian order conceptions in the post-Soviet space (see also Stewart 2017). Russia's neighborhood policy focus of 'gumanitarnoe sotrudnichestvo' (humanitarian cooperation'), in this reading, justifies a different approach towards the sovereignty of post-Soviet neighbors and Russia's use and instrumentalisation of its diaspora to reach its geopolitical objectives in this region. Ruth Deyermond (2016) writes in this context of a dual approach to sovereignty that Russia applies, and identifies a 'post-Soviet' approach for its neighborhood where sovereignty is contingent, and a 'Westphalian' model for everyone else outside of it. This is an assessment shared by Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy (2015) , who argue that Putin's view of foreign affairs is conditioned by his perspective of US-Russian relations, and that he sees Russia as the only truly sovereign power surrounded by states with 'contingent sovereignty'. Even scholars that do not buy into this rather exclusionary logic acknowledge that Russia's discourse on sovereignty and territorial integrity, voiced in its official public diplomacy, has not been implemented consistently in Russian policies towards its neighbours (Sakwa 2017, 257; Sherr 2013) . With the annexation of Crimea, Moscow illustrated that Ukrainian sovereignty was seen as negotiable. Seen in the context of the 'Russian World' conception as laid out above, the Russian state 'claimed' diasporas that were connected to their homeland on a linguistic and perhaps emotive dimension, but not necessarily on a political one. There is ample evidence that a belonging to an ethno-linguistic Russian diaspora does not automatically translate into pro-government sympathies for the Russian 'homeland' (Tishkov & Melvin 2015, 115; Heleniak 2004, 114; Kolstø 2010; Toal 2017, 268-273 ).
Yet, speculations that Russia's government might not consider the 'Russian World' to end at Russia's international borders were further nurtured when the term Novorossiya (New Russia) re-entered Russian public discourse at a time when tensions surrounding Russian interference in Ukraine were high (see also Jilge 2014; O'Loughlin, Toal and Kolosov 2017) .
The Russian government now re-discovered a term that had been used during Tsarist imperial times to emphasise the common heritage between Russia and Southeastern Ukraine under the administrative control of Russia, but which had never had fixed spatial delimitations.
Novorossiya was a geopolitical imaginary. With this re-discovered discourse, the Russian government linked its Ukraine policies to a conception of the 'Russian World' (as analysed above) that is not confined to the borders of the Russian Federation (Lavrov 2014) . 23 This was a deliberate semantic ambiguity with political connotations. Russia's discourse on diaspora This suggests that the Russian government was well aware of potential reputational costs, and that military adventures on foreign territory that is much more heterogeneous ethnically than Crimea would hardly be possible to justify. 24 And even in ethnically more clear-cut cases, Putin's policy of denying political responsibility and investing heavily in PR activities to cover up a territorial annexation suggests that the Russian government knew that the argument of compatriot protection was highly controversial. Absent a solid legal legitimacy, Russia has justified its annexation of Crimea with a reliance on more emotive elements of diaspora conceptualisations (such as language, cultural, and historic links), combined with an invocation of threats from 'fascists'.
Conclusion
In an oft-quoted remark, Putin (2005) however, was mostly an academic hobby horse for much of the 1990s, and a cause for nationalists and revisionist intellectuals to critique the Russian government (Toal 2017, 74-80) . The Yeltsin government was slow to develop policies towards its 'compatriots' abroad, and was reluctant to encourage inward migration. The perception of compatriots slowly changed from being a liability (under Yeltsin) to being a potential foreign policy asset (under Putin). Research, however, has found that a sense of belonging to a language group is separate from political allegiances or a sense of belonging to a diaspora politically defined (Tishkov 2008, 32-33; Smith 1999; Smith and Wilson 1997; Kosmarskaya 2011; Kallas 2016, 15; King & Melvin 2015, 115; Heleniak 2004, 114; Kolstø 2010; Toal 2017, 268-273) . Such a finding suggests a weaker correlation between language -or even citizenship -and senses of 'national' belonging than assumed by the Russian government. There seems to be less willingness on the part of Russian 'diasporas' to be mobilized for political causes.
Against this background, this paper has shown how the conceptual difficulties of defining diasporas were reflected in the array of terminologies used in Russian governmental parlance. Defining compatriots in a broad sense, Russia began to develop institutional structures, agencies, and programmes to pursue policies aimed at the 'protection' of the rights A lose application of the term 'compatriots' has served as a catch-all label to justify policies intended to 'protect' whoever classifies as a compatriot by Russian governmental definition (ethnic Russians, Russian-speakers, 'passportised' compatriots). In addition, eclectic arguments have been put forward to complement diaspora policies. The invocation of a threat ranged from references to an imminent genocide (in Georgia) to a fascist government in Ukraine. Thus, while the argument to protect Russian compatriots was employed on a rhetorical level, circumstantial factors in both cases differed and complicate an essentialist reading of Russian 'compatriot' policies as an instrument for territorial revisionism. The intended objective, it has been argued, was to explain the apparent contradictions in Russia's approaches to state sovereignty to an international audience. Geopolitical motivations like the prevention of Ukraine's and Georgia's integration into Western institutional structures were thus being couched in a language on human rights and 'humanitarianism', by which the Russian government mainly understands the protection of Russian minorities in neighbouring countries.
The analysis presented here has shown how a discrepancy between Russia's narrative projection about state sovereignty on an international level and breaches of the very same principle in its post-Soviet neighborhood were being smoothed out by 'compatriot' policies as a legitimizing factor. The instrumentalisation of identity politics as a discursive step to lay the groundwork for armed conflict became the means through which Russia justified controversial geopolitics to an international audience. Yet, as the conceptual evolution of
Russia's diaspora politics shows, this has been an iterative process rather than a brainchild for revisionist policies from the outset.
Notes
1 For a critique of the idea of Russian diaspora groups as sources for mobilisation in opposition to their host governments, see Lieven (1998, 243-268 Brubaker (2000) adds the category of 'accidental diasporas' that can form 'following a dramatic -and often traumatic -reconfiguration of political space' (2). 5 In a discussion with the author, Sergei Karagnov stated that the doctrine was 'a mistake', and described the evolution of the 'doctrine' as the outcome of a last-minute request by the foreign ministry in which he was asked to give a seminar on the status of Russians abroad. The proceedings of that seminar, Karaganov explained, became the basis for the 'Karaganov doctrine'. Discussion with 'young leaders', including the author, at the Higher School of Economics, Moscow, 17 February 2017, organised by the PICREADI center. 6 An Estonia foreign ministry official thus puts it in an interview: 'Russia feels they [Russian speakers in Estonia] are their compatriots, we feel they are our compatriots. The diaspora has been instrumentalised.' Author's interview, Tallinn, 7 June 2017. 7 Author's interview, Tallinn, 7 June 2017.
